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Abstract
In this paper we analyze and discuss the historical and philosophical
development of the notion of logical possibility focusing on its specific
meaning in classical and quantum mechanics. Taking into account the
logical structure of quantum theory we continue our discussion regard-
ing the Aristotelian Square of Opposition in orthomodular structures
enriched with a monadic quantifier [7]. Finally, we provide an inter-
pretation of the Orthomodular Square of Opposition exposing the fact
that classical possibility and quantum possibility behave formally in
radically different manners.
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1 The Modes of Physical Properties: Actuality
and Potentiality
The debate in Pre-Soctratic philosophy is traditionally understood as the
contraposition of the Heraclitean and the Eleatic schools of thought [18].
∗Fellow of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas y Te´cnicas (CONICET)
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Heraclitus was considered as defending the theory of flux, a doctrine of
permanent motion, change and unstability in the world. This doctrine pre-
cluded, as both Plato and Aristotle stressed repeatedly, the impossibility
to develop certain knowledge about the world. “This is so because Being,
over a lapse of time, has no stability. Everything that it is at this moment
changes at the same time, therefore it is not. This coming together of Being
and non-Being at one instant is known as the principle of coincidence of
opposites.” [20, p. 2] In contraposition to the Heraclitean school we find
Parmenides as the main character of the Eleatic school. Parmenides, as
interpreted also by Plato and Aristotle, taught the non-existence of motion
and change in reality, reality being absolutely One, and being absolutely
Being. In his famous poem Parmenides stated maybe the earliest intuitive
exposition of the principle of non-contradiction; i.e. that which is can only
be, that which is not, cannot be. In order to dissolve the problem of move-
ment, Aristotle developed a metaphysical scheme in which, through the
notions of actuality and potentiality, he was able to articulate both the Her-
aclitean and the Eleatic school [1]. On the one hand, potentiality contained
the undetermined, contradictory and non-individual realm of existence, on
the other, the mode of being of actuality was determined through the logi-
cal principles of existence and non-contradiction; it was through these same
principles together with the principle of identity that the concept of entity
was put forward. Through these principles the notion of entity is capable of
unifying, of totalizing in terms of a “sameness”, creating certain stability for
knowledge to be possible. This representation or transcendent description of
the world is considered by many the origin of metaphysical thought. Actu-
ality is then linked directly to metaphysical representation and understood
as characterizing a mode of existence independent of observation. This is
the way through which metaphysical thought was able to go beyond the hic
et nunc, creating a world beyond the world, a world of concepts.
Although Aristotle presents at first both actual and potential realms as
ontologically equivalent, from chapter 6 of book Θ, he seems to place actual-
ity in the central axis of his architectonic, relegating potentiality to a mere
supplementary role. “We have distinguished the various senses of ‘prior’,
and it is clear that actuality is prior to potentiality. [...] For the action is
the end, and the actuality is the action. Therefore even the word ‘actuality’
is derived from ‘action’, and points to the fulfillment.” [1050a17-1050a23]
Aristotle then continues to provide arguments in this line which show “[t]hat
the good actuality is better and more valuable than the good potentiality.”
[1051a4-1051a17] But, quite independently of the Aristotelian metaphysical
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scheme, it could be argued that the idea of potentiality could be developed
in order to provide a mode of existence independent of actuality. As we shall
see in the following, after modern science discarded almost completely the
potential realm, it was quantum theory through some of its authors that
potentiality became again a key concept for physics. Wolfgang Pauli had
seen this path in relation to the development of quantum mechanics itself.
As noted in a letter to C. G. Jung dated 27 February 1953:
“Science today has now, I believe, arrived at a stage where it can
proceed (albeit in a way as yet not at all clear) along the path laid down
by Aristotle. The complementarity characteristics of the electron (and
the atom) (wave and particle) are in fact ‘potential being,’ but one
of them is always ‘actual nonbeing.’ That is why one can say that
science, being no longer classical, is for the first time a genuine theory
of becoming and no longer Platonic.” [15, p. 93]
But before arriving to QM let us first analyze the relation between clas-
sical physics and the hilemorphic tradition.
2 The Actual Realm and Classical Physics
The importance of potentiality, which was first placed by Aristotle in equal
footing to actuality as a mode of existence, was soon diminished in the
history of western thought. As we have seen above, it could be argued that
the seed of this move was already present in the Aristotelian architectonic,
whose focus was clearly placed in the actual realm. The realm of potentiality,
as a different (ontological) mode of the being was neglected becoming not
more than mere (logical) possibility, a process of fulfillment. In relation
to the development of physics, the focus and preeminence was also given
to actuality. The XVII century division between ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res
extensa’ played in this respect an important role separating very clearly the
realms of actuality and potentiality. The philosophy which was developed
after Descartes kept ‘res cogitans’ (thought) and ‘res extensa’ (entities as
acquired by the senses) as separated realms.1
“Descartes knew the undisputable necessity of the connection, but
philosophy and natural science in the following period developed on the
1While ‘res cogitans’, the soul, was related to the indefinite realm of potentiality, ‘res
extensa’, i.e. the entities as characterized by the principles of logic, related to the actual.
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basis of the polarity between the ‘res cogitans’ and the ‘res extensa’,
and natural science concentrated its interest on the ‘res extensa’. The
influence of the Cartesian division on human thought in the following
centuries can hardly be overestimated, but it is just this division which
we have to criticize later from the development of physics in our time.”
[9, p. 73]
This materialistic conception of science based itself on the main idea that
extended things exist as being definite, that is, in the actual realm of exis-
tence. With modern science the actualist Megarian path was recovered and
potentiality dismissed as a problematic and unwanted guest. The trans-
formation from medieval to modern science coincides with the abolition of
Aristotelian hilemorphic metaphysical scheme —in terms of potentiality and
actuality— as the foundation of knowledge. However, the basic structure
of his metaphysical scheme and his logic still remained the basis for correct
reasoning. As noted by Verelst and Coecke:
“Dropping Aristotelian metaphysics, while at the same time con-
tinuing to use Aristotelian logic as an empty ‘reasoning apparatus’
implies therefore loosing the possibility to account for change and mo-
tion in whatever description of the world that is based on it. The fact
that Aristotelian logic transformed during the twentieth century into
different formal, axiomatic logical systems used in today’s philosophy
and science doesn’t really matter, because the fundamental principle,
and therefore the fundamental ontology, remained the same ([40], p.
xix). This ‘emptied’ logic actually contains an Eleatic ontology, that
allows only for static descriptions of the world.” [20, p. 7]
It was Isaac Newton who was able to translate into a closed mathemat-
ical formalism both, the ontological presuppositions present in Aristotelian
(Eleatic) logic and the materialistic ideal of ‘res extensa’ together with ac-
tuality as its mode of existence. In classical mechanics the representation
of the state of the physical system is given by a point in phase space Γ and
the physical magnitudes are represented by real functions over Γ. These
functions commute in between each others and can be interpreted as pos-
sessing definite values independently of measurement, i.e. each function can
be interpreted as being actual. The term actual refers here to preexistence
(within the transcendent representation) and not to the observation hic et
nunc. Every physical system may be described exclusively by means of its
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actual properties. The change of the system may be described by the change
of its actual properties. Potential or possible properties are considered as
the points to which the system might arrive in a future instant of time. As
also noted by Dieks:
“In classical physics the most fundamental description of a physical
system (a point in phase space) reflects only the actual, and nothing
that is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving prob-
abilities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distributions
ρ in statistical mechanics. But the occurrence of possibilities in such
cases merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual. The statis-
tical states do not correspond to features of the actual system (unlike
the case of the quantum mechanical superpositions), but quantify our
lack of knowledge of those actual features.” [2, p. 124]
Classical mechanics tells us via the equation of motion how the state of the
system moves along the curve determined by the initial conditions in Γ and
thus, as any mechanical property may be expressed in terms of Γ’s variables,
how all of them evolve. Moreover, the structure in which actual properties
may be organized is the (Boolean) algebra of classical logic.
3 Heisenberg and the Recovery of the Potential
Realm
The mechanical description of the world provided by Newton can be sketched
in terms of static pictures which provide at each instant of time the set of
definite actual properties within a given state of affairs [12, p. 609]. Obvi-
ously there is in this description a big debt to the Aristotelian metaphysical
scheme. However, the description of motion is then given, not via the path
from the potential to the actual, from matter into form, but rather via the
successions of actual states of affairs; i.e., stable situations, “pictures”, con-
stituted by sets of actual properties with definite values. As we discussed
above, potentiality becomes then superfluous. With the advenment of mod-
ern science and the introduction of mathematical schemes, physics seemed
capable of reproducing the evolution of the universe. The idea of an actual
state of affairs (i.e. the set of actual properties which characterize a system)
supplemented by the dynamics allowed then to imagine a Demon such as
that of Laplace capable of knowing the past and future states of the uni-
verse. If we could know the actual values at the definite instant of time we
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could also derive the actual set of properties in the future and the past. As
Heisenberg explains, this materialistic conception of science chose actuality
as the main aspect of existence:
“In the philosophy of Aristotle, matter was thought of in the re-
lation between form and matter. All that we perceive in the world of
phenomena around us is formed matter. Matter is in itself not a real-
ity but only a possibility, a ‘potentia’; it exists only by means of form.
In the natural process the ‘essence,’ as Aristotle calls it, passes over
from mere possibility through form into actuality. [...] Then, much
later, starting from the philosophy of Descartes, matter was primarily
thought of as opposed to mind. There were the two complementary as-
pects of the world, ‘matter’ and ‘mind,’ or, as Descartes put it, the ‘res
extensa’ and the ‘res cogitans.’ Since the new methodical principles of
natural science, especially of mechanics, excluded all tracing of corpo-
real phenomena back to spiritual forces, matter could be considered as
a reality of its own independent of the mind and of any supernatural
powers. The ‘matter’ of this period is ‘formed matter,’ the process of
formation being interpreted as a causal chain of mechanical interac-
tions; it has lost its connection with the vegetative soul of Aristotelian
philosophy, and therefore the dualism between matter and form [po-
tential and actual] is no longer relevant. It is this concept of matter
which constitutes by far the strongest component in our present use of
the word ‘matter’.” [9, p. 129]
As mentioned above, in classical mechanics the mathematical description
of the behavior of a system may be formulated in terms of the set of actual
properties. The same treatment can be applied to quantum mechanics.
However, the different structure of the physical properties of the system
in the new theory determines a change of nature regarding the meaning of
possibility and potentiality. Quantum mechanics was related to modality
since Born’s interpretation of the quantum wave function Ψ in terms of a
density of probability. But it was clear from the very beginning that this new
quantum possibility was something completely different from that considered
in classical theories. “[The] concept of the probability wave [in quantum
mechanics] was something entirely new in theoretical physics since Newton.
Probability in mathematics or in statistical mechanics means a statement
about our degree of knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we
do not know the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine
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the fall of the dice and therefore we say that the probability for throwing a
special number is just one in six. The probability wave function, however,
meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something.” [9, p. 42] It
was Heisenberg who went a step further and tried to interpret the wave
function in terms of the Aristotelian notion of potentia. Heisenberg argued
that the concept of probability wave “was a quantitative version of the old
concept of ‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something
standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event,
a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and
reality.” According to Heisenberg, the concept of potentiality as a mode
of existence has been used implicitly or explicitly in the development of
quantum mechanics:
“I believe that the language actually used by physicists when they
speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar notions as
the concept of ‘potentia’. So physicists have gradually become ac-
customed to considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but
rather as a kind of ‘potentia’.” [9, p. 156]
In this respect, one of the most interesting examples of an implicit use of
these ideas has been provided by Richard Feynmann in his path integral
approach [6]. Even though Feynman talks about calculating probabilities,
he seems to refer implicitly to of existent potentialities. Why, if not, should
we take into account the mutually incompatible paths of the electron in the
double-slit experiment? His approach considers every path as existent in the
mode of being of potentiality, there where the constrains of actuality cannot
be applied. But as we discussed elsewhere [16], Heisenberg’s attempt to
interpret quantum mechanics with a non-classical conceptual scheme might
have been highly compromised by Bohr’s own agenda. In any case, we must
admit that apart from some few remarks and analogies, Heisenberg’s inter-
pretation remained not only incomplete but also unclear in many aspects.
4 Quantum Possibility in the Orthomodular Struc-
ture
Elsewhere we have discussed the importance of distinguishing, both from
a formal and conceptual level the notion of (classical) possibility —arising
in the distributive Boolean structure— from that of quantum possibility
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—arising from an orthomodular structure. In order to discuss some inter-
pretational aspects of quantum possibility we first recall from [11, 14] some
notions about orthomodular lattices. A lattice with involution [10] is an al-
gebra 〈L,∨,∧,¬〉 such that 〈L,∨,∧〉 is a lattice and ¬ is a unary operation
on L that fulfills the following conditions: ¬¬x = x and ¬(x∨ y) = ¬x∧¬y.
An orthomodular lattice is an algebra 〈L,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1〉 of type 〈2, 2, 1, 0, 0〉
that satisfies the following conditions:
1. 〈L,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1〉 is a bounded lattice with involution,
2. x ∧ ¬x = 0.
3. x ∨ (¬x ∧ (x ∨ y)) = x ∨ y
We denote by OML the variety of orthomodular lattices. Let L be an
orthomodular lattice. Boolean algebras are orthomodular lattices satisfying
the distributive law x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z). We denote by 2 the
Boolean algebra of two elements. Let L be an orthomodular lattice. An
element c ∈ L is said to be a complement of a iff a ∧ c = 0 and a ∨ c = 1.
Given a, b, c in L, we write: (a, b, c)D iff (a∨b)∧c = (a∧c)∨(b∧c); (a, b, c)D∗
iff (a ∧ b) ∨ c = (a ∨ c) ∧ (b ∨ c) and (a, b, c)T iff (a, b, c)D, (a,b,c)D∗ hold
for all permutations of a, b, c. An element z of L is called central iff for all
elements a, b ∈ L we have (a, b, z)T . We denote by Z(L) the set of all central
elements of L and it is called the center of L.
Proposition 4.1 Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then we have:
1. Z(L) is a Boolean sublattice of L [14, Theorem 4.15].
2. z ∈ Z(L) iff for each a ∈ L, a = (a ∧ z) ∨ (a ∧ ¬z) [14, Lemma 29.9].
✷
In the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics, a property of (or
a proposition about) a quantum system is related to a closed subspace of
the Hilbert space H of its (pure) states or, analogously, to the projector
operator onto that subspace. Physical properties of the system are organized
in the orthomodular lattice of closed subspaces L(H) also called Hilbert
lattice. Let H be Hilbert space representing a quantum system. Differently
from the classical scheme, a physical magnitude M is represented by an
operator M acting over the state space. For bounded self-adjoint operators,
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conditions for the existence of the spectral decomposition M =
∑
i aiPi =∑
i ai|ai〉〈ai| are satisfied. The real numbers ai are related to the outcomes of
measurements of the magnitudeM and projectors |ai〉〈ai| to the mentioned
properties. Each self-adjoint operatorM has associated a Boolean sublattice
WM of L(H) which we will refer to as the spectral algebra of the operator
M. Assigning values to a physical quantity M is equivalent to establishing
a Boolean homomorphism v :WM → 2.
The fact that physical magnitudes are represented by operators on H
that, in general, do not commute has extremely problematic interpretational
consequences for it is then difficult to affirm that these quantum magnitudes
are simultaneously preexistent. In order to restrict the discourse to sets of
commuting magnitudes, different Complete Sets of Commuting Operators
(CSCO) have to be chosen. This choice has not found until today a clear
justification and remains problematic. This feature is called in the literature
quantum contextuality. The Kochen-Specker theorem (KS theorem for short)
rules out the non-contextual assignment of definite values to the physical
properties of a quantum system [13]. This may be expressed in terms of
valuations over L(H) in the following manner. We first introduce the concept
of global valuation. Let (Wi)i∈I be the family of Boolean sublattices of L(H).
Then a global valuation of the physical magnitudes over L(H) is a family of
Boolean homomorphisms (vi : Wi → 2)i∈I such that vi | Wi ∩Wj = vj |
Wi ∩Wj for each i, j ∈ I. If this global valuation existed, it would allow to
give values to all magnitudes at the same time maintaining a compatibility
condition in the sense that whenever two magnitudes shear one or more
projectors, the values assigned to those projectors are the same from every
context. The KS theorem, in the algebraic terms, rules out the existence
of global valuations when dim(H) > 2 [3, Theorem 3.2]. Contextuality can
be directly related to the impossibility to represent a piece of the world as
constituted by a set of definite valued properties independently of the choice
of the context. This definition makes reference only to the actual realm. But
as we know, QM makes probabilistic assertions about measurement results.
Therefore, it seems natural to assume that QM does not only deal with
actualities but also with possibilities.
Following [4] we delineate a modal extension for orthomodular lattices
that allows to formally represent, within the same algebraic structure, actual
and possible properties of the system. This allows us to discuss the restric-
tions posed by the theory itself to the actualization of possible properties.
Given a proposition about the system, it is possible to define a context
from which one can predicate with certainty about it together with a set of
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propositions that are compatible with it and, at the same time, predicate
probabilities about the other ones (Born rule). In other words, one may
predicate truth or falsity of all possibilities at the same time, i.e., possibili-
ties allow an interpretation in a Boolean algebra, i.e., if we refer with ✸P to
the possibility of P then, ✸P ∈ Z(L). This interpretation of possibility in
terms of the Boolean algebra of central elements of L reflects the fact that
one can simultaneously predicate about all possibilities because Boolean ho-
momorphisms of the form v : Z(L)→ 2 can be always established. If P is a
proposition about the system and P occurs, then it is trivially possible that
P occurs. This is expressed as P ≤ ✸P . Classical consequences that are
compatible with a given property, for example probability assignments to
the actuality of other propositions, shear the classical frame. These conse-
quences are the same ones as those which would be obtained by considering
the original actual property as a possible property. This is interpreted as,
if P is a property of the system, ✸P is the smallest central element greater
than P , i.e. ✸P = Min{z ∈ Z(L) : P ≤ z}. This enriched orthomodular
structure called Boolean saturated orthomodular lattices can be axiomatized
by equations conforming a variety denoted by OML✸ [4, Theorem 4.5].
Orthomodular complete lattices are examples of Boolean saturated ortho-
modular lattices. We can embed each orthomodular lattice L in an element
L✸ ∈ OML✸ see [4, Theorem 10]. The modal extension of L, namely L✸,
represents the fact that each orthomodular system can be modally enriched
in such a way as to obtain a new propositional system that includes the orig-
inal propositions in addition to their possibilities. Let L be an orthomodular
lattice and L✸ a modal extension of L. We define the possibility space of L
in L✸ as as the subalgebra of L✸ generated by the set {✸(P ) : P ∈ L}. This
algebra is denoted by ✸L and we can prove that it is a Boolean subalgebra
of the modal extension. Even though the modal extension L✸ of L repre-
sents the complete propositional system. The possibility space represents
a classical structure in which only the possibilities added to the discourse
about properties of the system are organized. Within this frame, the actu-
alization of a possible property acquires a rigorous meaning. Let L be an
orthomodular lattice, (Wi)i∈I the family of Boolean sublattices of L and L
✸
a modal extension of L. If f : ✸L → 2 is a Boolean homomorphism, an
actualization compatible with f is a global valuation (vi : Wi → 2)i∈I such
that vi | Wi ∩✸L = f | Wi ∩✸L for each i ∈ I. Compatible actualizations
represent the passage from possibility to actuality, they may be regarded as
formal constrains when applying the interpretational rules proposed in the
different modal versions. When taking into account compatible actualiza-
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tions from different contexts, an analogous of the KS theorem — which we
have called Modal Kochen Specker (MKS) for obvious reasons— holds for
possible properties.
Theorem 4.2 [4, Theorem 6.2] Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then L
admits a global valuation iff for each possibility space there exists a Boolean
homomorphism f : ✸L → 2 that admits a compatible actualization. ✷
The MKS theorem shows that no enrichment of the orthomodular lattice
with modal propositions allows to circumvent the contextual character of
the quantum language. Thus, from a formal perspective, one is forced to
conclude that quantum possibility is something different from classical pos-
sibility.
The larger structure allows to compare the classical and quantum cases.
In the classical case, the elements A ∈ ℘(Γ) interpreted as the properties of
the system are part of a Boolean algebra (with Γ the classical phase space
and ℘(Γ) its power set). The elements of the corresponding modal structure
are constructed by applying the possibility operator ✸ to the elements A.
These new elements ✸A, that belong to the modal structure, correspond
to possible properties as spoken in the natural language. However, in this
case, the seemingly larger structure that includes both actual and modal
propositions does not enlarge the expressive power of the language. This is
due to the fact that there exists a trivial correspondence between any pair
of classical valuations vc and wc of the actual and the possible structures to
truth-falsity. This relation can be written as follows: let Ak ∈ ℘(Γ), k a fix
index, then
wc(✸Ak) = 1⇔ vc(Ak) = 1
wc(✸Ak) = 0⇔ vc(Ak) = 0
Thus, given the state of a classical system, possible properties at a certain
time coincide with (simultaneous) actual ones, they may be identified. And
the distinction between the two sets of properties is never made. In fact,
when referring to possible properties of a system in a given state, one is
always making reference to future possible values of the magnitudes, values
that are determined because they are the evaluation of functions at points
(p, q) in Γ at future times. These points are determined by the equation
of motion. Thus, not even future possibilities are classically indeterminate
and they coincide with future actual properties. On the contrary, in the
quantum case, the projectors Pa = |a〉〈a| on H, which are interpreted as
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the properties of a system, belong to an orthomodular structure. As we
have mentioned above, the orthomodular lattice is enlarged with its modal
content by adding the elements ✸Q|a〉〈a|. Due to the fact that there is no
trivial relation between the valuations of subsets of the possible and actual
elements to truth-falsity, this new structure genuinely enlarges the expressive
power of the language. Formally, if wq(✸QPk) = 1, with Pk ∈ Wi, then
there exists a valuation vq such that vq(Pk) = 1 and another v
′
q such that
v′q(Pk) = 0. Thus, contrary to the classical case, even at the same instant of
time, we may consider two different kind of properties, two different realms,
possible and actual, that do not coincide.
5 OML✸-Square of Opposition
As we have previously discussed, the restriction of the notion of potentiality
to that of logical possibility has been of great importance for the develop-
ment of modern science. The need to interpret QM suggests the reconsider-
ation of this notion in the light of its non-classical structure. In order to do
so, we have studied the Aristotelian square of opposition in OML✸. Such
a version of the Square of Opposition is also called Modal Square of Op-
position (MSO) and expresses the essential properties of the monadic first
order quantifiers ∀, ∃. In an algebraic approach, these properties can be
represented within the frame of monadic Boolean algebras [8]. More pre-
cisely, quantifiers are considered as modal operators acting on a Boolean
algebra while the MSO is represented by relations between certain terms of
the language in which the algebraic structure is formulated.
¬✸¬p ¬✸p
✸p ✸¬p
contraries
subalterns
subcontraries
subalternscontradictories
◗
◗
◗
◗
✑
✑
✑
✑
The interpretations given to ✸ from different modal logics determine the
corresponding versions of the MSO and by changing the underlying Boolean
structure we obtain several generalizations of the monadic first order logic.
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In what follows we shall interpret this MSO in OML✸. This version of the
MSO will be referred as OML✸-Square of Opposition.
Let L be an orthomodular lattice and p ∈ L such that p 6∈ Z(L), i.e. p
can be seen as a non classical proposition in a quantum system represented
by L. Let L✸ be a modal extension of L, W be a Boolean subalgebra of
L, i.e. a context, such that p ∈ W and consider a classically expanded
context W✸ defined as the sub-algebra of L✸ generated by W ∪Z(L✸). To
analyze the Square, first of all we recall that ¬p is the orthocomplement
of p. Thus, ¬ does not act as a classical negation. But, when applied to
possible properties (¬✸p), ¬ acts as a classical negation since ✸p is a central
element.
• ¬✸¬p contraries ¬✸p
Contrary proposition is the negation of the minimum classical consequence
of ¬p (the orthogonal complement of p) with respect to the negation of
the minimum classical consequence of p. In the usual explanation, two
propositions are contrary iff they cannot both be true but can both be false.
In our framework we can obtain a similar concept of contrary propositions.
Note that (¬✸¬p) ∧ (¬✸p) ≤ p ∧ ¬p = 0. Hence there is not a Boolean
valuation v : W✸ → 2 such that v(¬✸¬p) = v(¬✸p) = 1, i.e. ¬✸¬p and
¬✸p “cannot both be true” in each possible classically expanded context
W✸. Since p 6∈ Z(L), it is not very hard to see that ✸p ∧ ✸¬p 6= 0. Then
there exists a Boolean valuation v : W✸ → 2 such that v(✸p ∧ ✸¬p) = 1.
Thus 0 = ¬v(✸p ∧✸¬p) = v(¬✸p) ∨ v(¬✸¬p). Hence ¬✸p and ¬✸¬p can
both be false.
• ✸p subcontraries ✸¬p
The sub-contrary proposition is the smallest classical consequence of p with
respect to the smallest classical consequence of ¬p. Note that sub-contrary
propositions do not depend on the context. In the usual explanation, two
propositions are sub-contrary iff they cannot both be false but can both
be true. Suppose that there exists a Boolean homomorphism v : W✸ → 2
such that v(✸p) = v(✸¬p) = 0. Since p ≤ ✸p and ¬p ≤ ✸¬p then v(p) =
v(¬p) = 0 which is a contradiction. Then they cannot both be false. Since
p 6∈ Z(L), it is not very hard to see that ✸p ∧ ✸¬p 6= 0. Hence there
exists a Boolean homomorphism v : W✸ → 2 such that 1 = v(✸p ∧✸¬p) =
v(✸p) ∧ v(✸¬p). Then ✸p and ✸¬p can both be true.
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• ¬✸¬p subalterns ✸p and ¬✸p subalterns ✸¬p
We study the subalterns propositions ¬✸¬p and ✸p since the other case
is analog. For our case, a subaltern proposition is the negation, in the
classical sense, of the minimum classical consequence of ¬p (the orthogonal
complement of p) with respect to the minimum classical consequence of
p. In the usual explanation, a proposition is subaltern to another one,
called superaltern, iff it must be true when its superaltern is true and the
superaltern must be false when its subaltern is false. In our case ¬✸¬p is
superaltern of ✸p and ¬✸p is superaltern of ✸¬p. Since ¬✸¬p ≤ p ≤ ✸p,
for each valuation v : W✸ → 2, if v(¬✸¬p) = 1 then v(✸p) = 1 and if if
v(✸p) = 0 then v(¬✸¬p) = 0 as is required in the subalterns propositions.
• ¬✸¬p contradictories ✸¬p and ✸p contradictories ¬✸p
The notion of contradictory propositions can be reduced to the relation be-
tween ✸p and ¬✸p. Contradictory propositions are the minimum classical
consequence of p with respect to the negation of its minimum classical con-
sequence. In the usual explanation, two propositions are contradictory iff
they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false. Since ✸p is a
central element, this property is trivially maintained for ✸p and ¬✸p.
We wish to remark that in terms of valuations the OML✸-Square of Op-
position behaves in analogous manner to the traditional Square of Opposi-
tion, the essential difference being that the concept of “opposed proposition”
represented in the OML✸-Square of Opposition is rooted in the concept of
minimum classical consequence of a property of a physical system. This fact
manifests itself in the following: if p were a classic proposition, i.e. p ∈ Z(L),
then p = ✸p. In other words, the minimum classical consequence of p is it-
self. In this way the concept of minimum classical consequence is trivialized,
and consequently, also the Square. More precisely, on the one hand the con-
cepts of contradictories, contraries and subcontraries propositions collapse
with the classical contradiction {p,¬p} and the subalternation collapses to
the trivial equivalence p↔ p.
The previous analysis exposes once again the fact that classical possi-
bility and quantum possibility formally behave in different manners. This
argument adds to the discussion provided in [17] calling the attention to the
misinterpretation of the notion of possibility in QM.
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